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CORPORATIONS AND EXPRESSIVE RIGHTS:
HOW THE LINES SHOULD BE DRAWN
Margaret M. Blair1
INTRODUCTION
In the last seven years, the U.S. Supreme Court has significantly
expanded the range of constitutional and statutory expressive rights
that it has granted to corporations.  It did so broadly in one case, sig-
naling that freedom of speech is apparently available to all corpora-
tions, regardless of what they are speaking on,2 and, additionally, it
did so in another case (a freedom of religion case) without carefully
distinguishing which types of corporations would be granted the rights
and which types would not.3  In an article I previously published with
Elizabeth Pollman, we argued that a broad-brush grant of expressive
rights across the board to all corporations cannot be justified even
though it may be appropriate to recognize certain constitutional rights
for specific corporations.4  To grant rights in a sensible way, the U.S.
Supreme Court must more carefully articulate its rationale for grant-
ing some rights to certain corporations.  In particular, the Court needs
to develop a framework for thinking about why particular types of
corporations should have certain rights in certain circumstances, while
other corporations should not automatically be granted those same
1. Milton R. Underwood Chair in Free Enterprise, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School.
Special thanks to Elizabeth Pollman who shared her wisdom with me and to the participants in
the 21st Annual Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy: The Supreme Court, Busi-
ness and Civil Justice at DePaul University College of Law.
2. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (“No sufficient
governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corpora-
tions.”).  “[T]he Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s
corporate identity.” Id.
3. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759, 2785 (2014) (specifying that
the case at issue involved a “closely held” corporation and that the Court’s holding applies to
“closely held corporations”).  For a discussion of how the law should delineate which corpora-
tions are closely held when applying the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s contra-
ception mandate (the issue at stake in Hobby Lobby), see Robert P. Bartlett III et al., Hobby
Lobby and Closely Held Corporations, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Oct. 13, 2014), http://clsbluesky
.law.columbia.edu/2014/10/13/hobby-lobby-and-closely-held-corporations/.
4. Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional
Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV., 1673, 1742–43 (2015) (discussing the need for the U.S. Su-
preme Court to draw lines between corporations in determining their rights).
253
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL212.txt unknown Seq: 2  2-AUG-16 9:34
254 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:253
rights just because they are corporations.5  In other words, not all cor-
porations are alike when it comes to the allocation of corporate con-
stitutional rights.  The U.S. Supreme Court must “draw lines” to map
out the contours of corporate constitutional rights.  Professor Pollman
and I proposed a framework for understanding the U.S. Supreme
Court’s corporate rights decisions based on the idea that when rights
are granted to corporations, this granting of rights must be based ei-
ther on a “derivative” rationale (the rights are derived from some
group of natural persons) or on an “instrumental” rationale (granting
the right to the corporation protects the rights of some parties outside
the corporation).6  Neither of these rationales justifies an across-the-
board grant of expressive rights to all corporations.  I explore the im-
plications of this framework for corporate constitutional rights in this
Article.
The problem arises because many types of corporations exist.  The
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP), ExxonMobil Corp. (ExxonMobil), Hobby Lobby Stores
(Hobby Lobby), Inc., Alibaba Group Holding Ltd. (Alibaba), the
Mayo Clinic, and Grandma’s Bakery, which sells homemade bread
and muffins at the local farmers market, have very little in common
with each other except that they are all organized as corporations or
similar entities.7  Each of these six organizations uses the corporate
5. As I will discuss in more detail infra, the U.S. Supreme Court has, at times, distinguished
newspaper and media companies from other companies with respect to granting speech rights.
See Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1036–37 (2011) (dis-
cussing the Court’s press jurisprudence and treatment of the press); infra Part III.A.1.  The
Court indicated that religious liberty rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, as
recognized in Hobby Lobby, were limited to religious nonprofits and closely held, for-profit
corporations. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785 (“The contraceptive mandate, as ap-
plied to closely held corporations, violates RFRA.”).  Congress and the Court have also histori-
cally recognized a distinction between for-profit and nonprofit corporations for some purposes.
See James D. Nelson, The Freedom of Business Association, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 461, 504–11
(2015) (discussing the for-profit versus nonprofit dichotomy in the freedom of association doc-
trine).  And, since the 1930s, federal securities laws have distinguished between corporations
with publicly traded securities and those whose securities are not publicly traded. See, e.g., Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 12, 48 Stat. 881, 892–94 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 786 (2012)); see also Elizabeth Pollman, Line Drawing in Corporate
Rights Determinations, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 12) (discussing
the various ways that the law distinguishes different types of corporations).
6. Blair & Pollman, supra note 4, at 1742–43. R
7. The author expresses her apologies to the multiple actual organizations with the name
“Grandma’s Bakery” that can be found by conducting a Google search.  As used in this Article,
“Grandma’s Bakery” is a hypothetical corporation that represents a particular type of corpora-
tion designated by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as an “S Corporation.”  The IRS stated
that for 2003, S Corporations, which can have no more than seventy-five shareholders, “ac-
counted for 61.9 percent of the 5.4 million corporate returns filed.”  Kelly Luttrell, S Corporation
Returns, 2003, SOI BULL., Spring 2006, at 91, 93, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/spring06bul.pdf.
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form for somewhat different reasons and uses somewhat different as-
pects of corporate law.  The NAACP is a nonprofit membership cor-
poration that has no shareholders but over 500,000 members and
supporters.8  ExxonMobil is a for-profit business corporation that op-
erates globally with hundreds of subsidiaries and tens of thousands of
employees and shareholders.9  Additionally, a large proportion of Ex-
xonMobil’s stock is held by institutional investors.10  Hobby Lobby is,
famously, a family-owned business corporation with only five share-
holders11 but over 600 stores12 and more than 20,000 employees.13
Alibaba is a holding company chartered in the Cayman Islands.  It has
a complex contractual relationship with several operating corpora-
tions in China that actually carry out the business activities of
Alibaba.  The shares of Alibaba that trade on the New York Stock
Exchange are not equity shares in the operating companies—they are
“American Depository Shares” (ADSs), which are interests in the
Cayman Islands’ entity.14  The Mayo Clinic is a complex network of
related nonprofit corporations.  It has no shareholders15 but has
thousands of employees, customers, and donors.16  Grandma’s Bakery
is organized as a corporation but only has one shareholder and two
employees.17
One important reason why all of these organizations use a corpo-
rate form is that when a corporation is formed, the law creates a sepa-
rate legal entity that then holds the property and enters into contracts
8. See NAACP: 100 Years of History, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/pages/naacp-history (last
visited Aug. 20, 2015).
9. See Exxon Mobil, FORTUNE 500, http://fortune.com/fortune500/exxon-mobil-2/ (last visited
June 13, 2016) (reporting the number of employees); Exxon Mobil Corporation (XOM), YA-
HOO! FIN., https://finance.yahoo.com/q/mh?s=XOM+Major+Holders (last visited July 30, 2015)
(reporting the number of shareholders).
10. Exxon Mobil Corporation (XOM), supra note 9. R
11. Technically, the five members of the Green family operate the company through a trust.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2765 (2014) (“The Greens operate Hobby
Lobby . . . through a management trust, of which each member of the family serves as trustee.”).
12. Our Story, HOBBY LOBBY, http://www.hobbylobby.com/about-us/our-story (last visited
Aug. 21, 2015).
13. #118 Hobby Lobby Stores, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/companies/hobby-lobby-
stores/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2015).
14. Alibaba Group Holding Ltd., Registration Statement (Form F-1) (May 6, 2014), http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1577552/000119312514184994/d709111df1.htm.
15. See Frequently Asked Questions, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/giving-to-
mayo-clinic/contact-us/frequently-asked-questions (last visited Aug. 21, 2015).
16. See About Mayo Clinic, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/giving-to-mayo-clinic/
contact-us/frequently-asked-questions (last visited Aug. 21, 2015).
17. See supra note 7. R
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with other parties to carry out its activities.18  In the nineteenth cen-
tury, when the U.S. Supreme Court began recognizing corporations as
entities with constitutional rights, none of the corporations in exis-
tence at that time looked like any of the six modern corporations
mentioned supra.  They had likely come into existence by means of
special charters issued by a state to local merchants or business peo-
ple, specifically to carry out some enterprise or infrastructure project,
such as building a bridge or operating a bank, that would provide ser-
vices to the community.19  Their charters imposed fairly strict limits on
what the corporations could do.20  But, like the people who form cor-
porations today, the organizers of the early corporations found the
corporate form useful because the form made it possible to commit
resources to an enterprise that could not be withdrawn if one of the
participants or investors needed to get out of the investment.21
The corporate constitutional rights cases decided by the U.S. Su-
preme Court in the nineteenth century reinforced this function of the
corporate form by determining that with respect to property and con-
tract, the corporation at issue generally had the same rights as a natu-
ral person would have in an otherwise similar situation.22  In deciding
these early cases, the rationale that the Court most frequently gave
was that granting a right to a corporation protected the rights of natu-
ral persons behind the corporation, people who, it was probably fair to
assume at the time, had come together to form the corporation or
18. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 73 (2010) (“The corporation
has been regarded from its inception as a legal entity distinct from its owners.”); see also Mar-
garet M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the
Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 390 (2003) (“[I]ncorporation gave the enterprise
‘entity’ status under the law . . . .”); Leo E. Strine, Jr. &  Nicholas Walter, Originalist or Original:
The Difficulties of Reconciling Citizens United with Corporate Law History 17 n.74 (Harvard
John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 812, 2015), http://dx.doi.org/
10.2139/ssrn.2564708 (“To contend that a corporation is the owners of its equity is to reject cor-
poration law itself.”).
19. See Blair, supra note 18, at 423 (identifying the types of corporations that existed in the R
U.S. during the early nineteenth century); Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, The Evolu-
tion of Shareholder Voting Rights: Separation of Ownership and Consumption, 123 YALE L.J.
948, 959–67 (2014) (finding that early corporations were chartered by local merchants and
wealthy landowners to build bridges, canals, other infrastructure projects and, additionally, to
provide insurance and banking services to their communities).
20. Corporate charters were highly specific and narrowly construed in the first half of the
nineteenth century. See, e.g., EDWIN MERRICK DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UN-
TIL 1860, at 189 (1954) (discussing cases in which courts found contracts void because “all those
[contracts] which were not expressly or impliedly authorized, were contracts which were necessa-
rily void”).
21. Blair, supra note 18, at 390 (“[T]he critical advantage of the corporate form [was] . . . the R
ability to commit capital, once amassed, for extended periods of time—for decades and even
centuries.”).
22. See Blair & Pollman, supra note 4, at 1743. R
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participate in it because of its special ability to structure property and
contractual relationships.23  In each case, the corporation at issue was
seen by the Court as standing in the place of natural persons with
respect to the property and contract rights.
In the twentieth century, however, the Court began expanding the
rights available to corporations to include certain protections for de-
fending against criminal charges24 plus a variety of “expressive” rights,
such as freedom of association, freedom of press, freedom of speech,
and, most recently, freedom to exercise religion.25  The Court, when
recognizing that corporations have expressive rights, has continued to
use the rationale that it is protecting the rights of the people behind
the corporations.26
Exercising expressive rights is a quintessential human activity.27  In-
dividuals may join certain corporations, such as membership corpora-
tions or political action organizations, as a way to express certain
rights.28  For example, the NAACP was specifically formed to allow its
members to associate together, express their political views, and lobby
23. Id. at 1694–95.
24. This was necessary because the Court, in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co.
v. United States, found, for the first time, that a corporation could be held criminally liable for
the actions of its agents.  212 U.S. 481, 494–95 (1909); see also Blair & Pollman, supra note 4, at R
1715–16 (discussing the Court’s corporate criminal law jurisprudence).
25. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014); Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 770, 773 (1976); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958); Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76–77 (1906), overruled in part by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y.
Harbor, 378 U.S. 52  (1964).  The recognition that a business corporation can “exercise religion”
came in a case involving statutory interpretation, rather than a constitutional right. See Hobby
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785.  Although the phrase “expressive rights” usually encompasses free-
dom of speech, press, and association, for purposes of this Article, I am including freedom to
practice religion as an expressive right.
26. See discussion infra Part II.
27. As part of her “capabilities approach” to understanding human rights, Martha Nussbaum,
Professor of Law and Ethics at the University of Chicago, wrote of the “legal guarantees of
freedom of expression” as “aspects of the general capability to use one’s mind and one’s senses
in a way directed by one’s own practical reason[,]” and “guarantees of non-interference with
certain choices that are especially personal and definitive of selfhood.” See Martha C. Nuss-
baum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 277 (1997) (quoting Martha C.
Nussbaum, Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings, in WOMEN, CULTURE, AND DEVELOP-
MENT: A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES 61, 84–85 (M. Nusssbaum & J. Glover eds., 1995)).
28. Nelson, supra note 5, at 464–68  (discussing the history of disparate treatment by the U.S. R
Supreme Court of nonprofit corporations, which have greater institutional autonomy than for-
profit corporations to exclude groups as members, on the grounds that nonprofit organizations
are “expressive associations,” while for-profit corporations are “commercial associations”).
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for their civil rights.29  Thus, in 1958, the Court found that the NAACP
had a constitutional right to withhold its membership lists from Ala-
bama authorities to protect its members’ freedom of association.30
However, the argument that granting a right to a corporation pro-
tects the people behind the corporation is undermined if it is used to
recognize a corporate right when the people behind the corporation
did not organize through the corporate form to exercise that particu-
lar right.  Line drawing is essential in the context of expressive rights.
Of the people who interact with a corporation, it matters which ones
are assumed to be represented by the corporation, what role they play
in the corporation, and why they associated together in the corporate
form.
In reviewing the Court’s reasoning in cases involving expressive
rights for corporations, it becomes clear that at least two dimensions
have, at times, been important, and should be important, to the Court
in every case in which it is deciding whether a particular corporation
has a particular right.  The first dimension is a “people” dimension—
who, exactly, are the people behind a given corporation who are be-
lieved to be acting together through the corporation rather than acting
alone?  What role is each person playing in the corporation?  And,
who among those people deserves to have her interests taken into ac-
count in granting a particular right to the corporation?  The question
of whose interests should be considered in assigning rights to the cor-
poration is important because, depending on the right at issue, grant-
ing a right to a corporation may be a benefit to some of the people
involved in the corporation—corporate managers for example—but a
detriment to other people, such as customers or employees, who the
corporation might be thought to represent for some purposes.
The second dimension is the “purpose” of the corporation at issue.
Why did these people come together to act through this corporation?
For what purpose was the corporation formed, and is that purpose
closely related to the expressive right at issue?  The purpose dimen-
sion matters because the reason that various people who might be rep-
resented by the corporation came together may have nothing at all to
do with the right in question.  Over one-half of the common shares of
29. NAACP: 100 Years of History, supra note 8 (discussing the NAACP’s history and “princi- R
pal objective . . . to ensure the political, educational, social and economic equality of minority
group citizens of United States and eliminate race prejudice”).
30. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 466.  The nonprofit corporate sector became a widely used organiza-
tional form in the post-World War II period in the United States when open access to the use of
the form came to be regarded as necessary for freedom of association. See Jonathan Levy, From
Fiscal Triangle to Passing Through: Rise of the Nonprofit Corporation (unpublished manuscript)
(manuscript at 3–4) (on file with author).
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ExxonMobil, for example, are owned by big mutual funds and other
institutional investors.31  It is not plausible to imagine that these insti-
tutional investors, plus a large number of individual investors, came
together for the purpose of advocating or expressing support for cer-
tain political candidates.  Thus, it would defy reason to say Exx-
onMobil represents its shareholders for the purpose of expressing
political preferences in election campaigns.
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,32 the Court
could have decided the case on narrow grounds and reached the same
result by observing that Citizens United (the organization) repre-
sented a specific group of like-minded people who came together to
pool their resources for the purpose of political expression, and, there-
fore, it was necessary to grant free speech rights to the corporation to
protect the freedom of speech rights of the people behind it.  But, that
is not what the Court did.  Instead, the Court decided the case broadly
and did not distinguish Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation
whose business is political advocacy, from other types of corpora-
tions.33  Although the Court said that its decision was based on the
idea that the First Amendment protects speech and does not look to
the corporate identity of the speaker,34 it is very hard to believe that
the Court would have reached the same conclusion if the plaintiff in
the case had been, say, Alibaba.35
In the dimension of corporate purpose, the Court has generally dis-
cussed (on a case-by-case basis), or at least made reference to, the
purpose of the specific corporations at issue in its rulings on corporate
rights.36  But, it has not always been clear in its decisions how purpose
entered into its reasoning.
31. See Exxon Mobil Corporation (XOM), supra note 9. R
32. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
33. Id. at 365 (“[T]he Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the
speaker’s corporate identity.”).
34. Id. at 341 (“The First Amendment protects speech and speaker, and the ideas that flow
from each.”); id. at 347 (“[T]he First Amendment does not allow political speech restrictions
based on a speaker’s corporate identity.”); see Blair & Pollman, supra note 4, at 1725 (discussing R
the Court’s use of an instrumental rationale for its corporate rights rulings with respect to free-
dom of speech).  See infra Part III.A.3, for a further discussion of instrumental rationales.
35. See Toni M. Massaro, Foreign Nationals, Electoral Spending, and the First Amendment, 34
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 663, 703 (2011) (“The Court nevertheless is likely to uphold the re-
strictions to prevent undue foreign influence over elections.  To do so, however, will require the
Court to blink its own First Amendment theory and its professed constitutional faith.”).
36. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319, 365 (noting that “Citizens United is a nonprofit
corporation” but then applying its decision broadly to all corporations); First Nat’l Bank of Bos.
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767–68, 776 (1978) (noting that the appellants were “two national bank-
ing associations and three business corporations” but then deciding that the purpose and busi-
ness of the corporations are irrelevant to its finding that the Massachusetts law at issue inhibited
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The Court’s failure to satisfactorily address this issue in its recent
decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.37 is a significant
source of the controversy surrounding that decision.38  By contrast,
relatively little controversy surrounded the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services’s (HHS) earlier decision to grant em-
ployee health care plan exemptions regarding birth control methods
to a subset of nonprofit, religious-based organizations on the ground
that those requirements were inconsistent with the organizations’
deeply held religious beliefs that they were dedicated to advancing.39
Counsel for the government in Hobby Lobby argued that this exemp-
tion should not apply to the plaintiff corporations because they were
for-profit corporations and, thus, could not be in the business of ad-
vancing religious beliefs.40  The Court rejected that argument, stating
that nothing in state-level corporate law precludes a corporation, even
a for-profit business corporation, from exercising religion.41  In lan-
guage that will likely be repeated in corporate law cases in the coming
free speech); N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 212 U.S. 481, 494–95 (1909) (discussing facts
of the case that were specific to the corporation’s business but deciding the case broadly).
“[T]here is a large class of offenses . . . wherein the crime consists in purposely doing the things
prohibited by statute.  In that class of crimes we see no good reason why corporations may not
be held responsible for and charged with [a crime].” Id.  However, in cases involving the free-
dom of speech of media corporations, the fact that the corporation involved was a media corpo-
ration played a significant role in the Court’s decision prior to Bellotti.
37. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
38. E.g., David T. Ball, The Hobby Lobby Surprise: Making Money Can Be a Religious Expe-
rience, BUS. L. TODAY, Dec. 2014, at 1, 3 (“As for the Court’s decision on the threshold issue, it
definitely surprised many, and angered some.”).  See James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorpo-
rated, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565, 1565, for an argument that the “[f]ree exercise doctrine
should . . . resist corporate claims to exemptions from the law.”
39. See generally Administration Issues Final Rules on Contraceptive Coverage and Religious
Organizations, HHS.GOV (July 28, 2013), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2013pres/06/
20130628a.html (discussing how the final rule worked to respect houses of worship and other
nonprofit religious organizations by creating an exemption for contraceptive coverage in their
health plans).  There was some controversy surrounding the contraceptive coverage mandate
when its outlines were first announced. See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Both Sides Eager To Take Birth
Control Coverage Issue to Voters, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/16/
us/politics/both-sides-eager-to-take-contraception-mandate-debate-to-voters.html; Laurie Good-
stein, Bishops Reject White House’s New Plan on Contraception, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2012, http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/us/catholic-bishops-criticize-new-contraception-proposal.html.
This is why the government provided the exemption for nonprofit religious organizations.
HHS’s decision to exempt the religious organizations did not spark further controversy.  Christi
Parsons et al., Obama’s Birth-Control Compromise Wins Some Support, BALT. SUN, Feb. 10,
2012, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-02-10/health/sc-dc-0211-contraceptives-fight-
20120210_1_president-obama-coverage-valerie-jarrett.
40. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2767.
41. Id. at 2770 (concluding that the government’s argument “flies in the face of modern corpo-
rate law”); see, e.g., Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70
BUS. LAW. 1, 6–7 (2014) (asserting that corporate law permits corporations to pursue goals other
than shareholder wealth maximization); Brett McDonnell, The Liberal Case for Hobby Lobby
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years, the Court observed that corporate law “does not require corpo-
rations to pursue profit at the expense of everything else, and many do
not do so.”42  The Court seemed to acknowledge that its holding
should not be applied to all corporations by frequently referring to the
plaintiff corporations as “closely-held.”43  But, it neither defined
“closely held” nor explained why its reasoning should only apply to
closely held corporations.44  Thus, we do not have a clear road map
based on that case to tell us which corporations should have protected
rights to practice religion and which should not.  In sorting that issue
out in future cases, the question of corporate purpose will likely play a
large role.  Indeed, the question in Hobby Lobby should not have
been whether corporate law in general prohibits for-profit corpora-
tions from practicing religion, but whether the plaintiff corporations in
the case were, in fact, formed for that purpose.
This Article proceeds as follows.  In Part II, I review the people
dimension of how the Court should draw lines among the many vari-
eties of corporations in existence.  Part III reviews the purpose dimen-
sion.  Part IV offers some concluding thoughts about how analysis in
these two dimensions should guide a court considering expressive
rights for corporations.
II. WHO ARE THE PEOPLE INVOLVED IN A CORPORATION?
The question of who the people are behind a corporation is impor-
tant because the U.S. Supreme Court has clearly said that it recog-
nizes corporations as having rights not because a corporation is a legal
“person” but because there are natural persons represented by the
corporation whose rights will be best protected by according the right
or protection in question to the corporation.45  The Court adopted this
(Minn. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 14-39, 2014), http://dx.doi.org/
10.2139/ssrn.2513380.
42. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771 (“While it is certainly true that a central objective of for-
profit corporations is to make money, modern corporate law does not require for-profit corpora-
tions to pursue profit at the expense of everything else, and many do not do so.”).  Leo E. Strine,
Jr., Chief Justice, of the Delaware Supreme Court has scathingly written of the Court’s reasoning
and understanding of corporate law in Hobby Lobby. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., A Job Is Not a
Hobby: The Judicial Revival of Corporate Paternalism and Its Problematic Implications (Harvard
John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 804, 2015), http://?dx.doi.org/
?10.2139/?ssrn.2555816.
43. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. passim.
44. Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory in Hobby Lobby, in THE RISE OF CORPO-
RATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY ch. 8 (Zoe¨ Robinson et al. eds., 2016); Pollman, supra note 5 (manu- R
script at 28).
45. Blair & Pollman, supra note 4, at 1678 (“[T]he Court’s reasoning in these [nineteenth R
century cases] was based on an understanding of corporations as associations of individuals . . . .
This tracing of early case law shows that despite public perceptions, the Court has never based its
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rationale early in the nineteenth century and repeated it as recently as
in Hobby Lobby, asserting that “[w]hen rights, whether constitutional
or statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect
the rights of . . . people.”46  “A corporation is simply a form of organi-
zation used by human beings to achieve desired ends.  An established
body of law specifies the rights and obligations of the people (includ-
ing shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with the
corporation in one way or another.”47  That made sense in the nine-
teenth century when corporations were relatively simple organizations
with stable, identifiable investors and senior executives and the rights
at issue were property and contract rights.48  Shareholders in the earli-
est business corporations, such as those chartered in the early nine-
teenth century to build bridges or open banks, were likely to be local
merchants and prosperous landowners who wanted the services that
the corporation would provide.49
A key advantage of early corporations was that they enabled a
group of people to act as one “body”50 for purposes of owning prop-
erty and entering into contracts.  Until the 1950s, the corporate form
was not generally available for use by single individuals or by other
corporations; in fact, state-level corporate law in the United States
typically required that at least three or more natural persons act to-
gether to form a corporation.51  Since the middle of the twentieth cen-
corporate rights jurisprudence on the idea that a corporation is a constitutionally protected ‘per-
son’ in its own right.”).
46. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
47. Id.
48. Blair & Pollman, supra note 4, at 1673–74, 1697–1700. R
49. Id. at 1699–1700; see Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 19; Joseph H. Sommer, The R
Birth of the American Business Corporation:  Of Banks, Corporate Governance, and Social Re-
sponsibility, 49 BUFF. L. REV., 1011, 1021, 1034–35 (2001) (showing that early banks were
chartered by local merchants who wanted to ensure that banking services would be available in
their community).
50. E.g., 1 STEWART KYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 13 (1793) (defining a
corporation as “a collection of many individuals, united into one body” that has “perpetual [suc-
cession] under an artificial form” and is “vested, by the policy of the law, with the capacity of
acting, in several respects, as an individual”).
51. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 47 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1950) (“Three or more natural persons
. . . may act as incorporators of a corporation”).  As of 1960, according to the notation to Model
Business Corporation Act [MCBA], §2.01, “all but nine states specified that the incorporators
must be three or more natural persons,” and the comment to the 1960 MBCA stated that the Act
“follow[ed] the traditional concept of several individuals combining to form a corporation.”  The
MBCA was changed in 1962 to permit incorporation by a single person, or by another
corporation.
Case law going back at least to 1871 suggests that when, on occasion, a single individual came
to hold all of the shares of a corporation, courts would still recognize that the corporation was a
separate entity from the owner of its shares.  Margaret M. Blair, The Four Functions of Corpo-
rate Personhood, in HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: INTEGRATING ECONOMIC THE-
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tury, however, most states have permitted corporations to be formed
by a single individual or even by other corporations.  The result has
been a huge proliferation of corporations created for a very wide
range of activities and utilizing variations of the corporate form.
Many contemporary corporations cannot plausibly be regarded as
representing an identifiable group of natural persons.  For example,
ExxonMobil operates in over 200 countries through a complex web of
more than 150 operating subsidiaries and holding companies.52  Con-
sider Exxon Neftegas Ltd. (Neftegas), a wholly-owned Russian-based
subsidiary of ExxonMobil.  Who are the natural persons behind this
corporation?  Are they the sole shareholder of Neftegas, which is it-
self a corporation?  Are they the shareholders of ExxonMobil, the
parent corporation, more than one-half of whom are financial institu-
tions, such as mutual funds and pension plans53 and many of the rest
trade in and out of the stock, sometimes at high speed?  Are they the
managers of the subsidiary, many of whom may be Russian? And, if
we can identify some natural persons whom Neftegas can be under-
stood to represent for some purposes, would they have protected sta-
tus under the U.S. Constitution?  Do we have reason to believe
Neftegas represents them for expressive purposes and that recogniz-
ing the corporation as having expressive rights would serve to protect
those natural persons’ expressive rights?  For a corporation with these
characteristics, it would be extremely troubling if the U.S. Supreme
Court decided that the company has the right to participate in the
political process in the United States by having an unlimited right to
make expenditures supporting a candidate for office.
If the Court is going to follow a decision-rule that grants expressive
rights to corporations derivatively—rights that are derived from the
natural persons believed to be behind the corporations—then the
Court must be able to look behind the corporation to identify who the
natural persons are and in what capacity they are involved in the cor-
ORY AND ORGANIZATION THEORY 440, 458 nn. 35 & 36 (Anna Grandori ed., 2013) (footnote
omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.01 hist. n.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2008)).  As early as 1888, New Jersey liberalized its corporation laws to permit corporations to
merge and hold stock in other corporations.  Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate
Chartermonging, 1875–1929, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 677, 681 (1989).  But, corporations could not be
formed by another corporation or by a single individual prior to the changes that took place in
state law in the 1950s and 1960s.  Blair, supra note 51, at 452, 458 nn. 35 & 36. R
52. ExxonMobil’s 2010 annual filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission listed 170
different affiliated companies, most of which were wholly owned by the parent company. See
Exxon Mobil Corp., Annual Report (Form10-K/A) (Dec. 31, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/Arch
ives/edgar/data/34088/000119312511050134/dex21.htm.
53. See supra notes 9–10, 31, and accompanying text (discussing ExxonMobil’s shareholders).
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poration.54  Thus, before awarding constitutionally protected expres-
sive rights to a particular corporation, the Court must ask at least four
questions about the people behind the corporation from whom these
rights could be derived.
A. Are the Relevant Persons Natural Persons
or Institutional Persons?
Institutional persons do not inherently have constitutionally pro-
tected expressive rights.55  So, if a corporation is a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of another corporation, then the presumption should be that
no constitutionally protected expressive rights for the subsidiary cor-
poration can be derived from natural persons unless a case can be
made that the relevant natural persons whose rights are being pro-
tected are not the corporation’s shareholders (the parent corporation
in the case of Neftegas) but, rather, the managers, employees, custom-
ers, or some other group of natural persons.56  A similar result should
apply if a majority of the corporation’s shares are held by institutional
investors, such as pension funds or mutual funds.  For these corpora-
tions, even if some of the stockholders are natural persons, those natu-
ral persons cannot control the corporation,57 so the corporation
cannot be said to represent them for expressive purposes.  Again, an
exception might apply if a case can be made that the relevant natural
persons whom the corporation represents are some other actors, such
as managers, employees, or customers.
B. Are the Relevant Natural Persons U.S. Citizens or Residents,
or are They Foreign Citizens?
If the relevant group of natural persons whom the corporation is
believed to represent are not citizens or residents of the United States,
then they may not be entitled to constitutional protections and a cor-
54. The Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court questioned the appropriateness of re-
garding modern business corporations as “associations of individuals.” See Strine & Walter,
supra note 18 (manuscript at 17 n.74) (“It is a stretch to say the modern corporation is an associ- R
ation of individuals, given that most corporate stock is held by institutional investors.”).
55. See, e.g., Blair & Pollman, supra note 4, at 1680–96 (citing cases showing that the U.S. R
Supreme Court grounded its grants of constitutionally protected rights to corporations on the
idea that corporations are “associations of persons”).
56. See infra Part II.C. (discussing the various roles that natural persons can play in a
corporation).
57. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Pullman Iron & Steel Co., 143 Ill. 197, 207 (1892) (“It is . . . funda-
mental in the law of corporations, that the majority of its stockholders shall control the policy of
the corporation, and regulate and govern the lawful exercise of its franchise and business.”).
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poration representing their interests has no derivative basis for a claim
of constitutional protection for expressive rights.58
C. What Role Do People Who Are Associated with the Corporation
and Have Expressive Rights Play?
I consider four of the primary roles natural persons can play in cor-
porations; each have different implications for expressive rights
questions.
1. Does the Corporation Have “Members”?
If the people behind the corporation are members, as we would find
in a nonprofit membership corporation such as the American Civil
Liberties Union, Inc.59 or the National Rifle Association,60 and if
there is reason to believe the members joined together in the organi-
zation for expressive purposes, then this provides a clear basis for the
idea that granting expressive rights to the organization may be neces-
sary to protect the expressive rights of the members.61
The history of nonprofit membership corporations in the United
States supports this approach to corporate rights.  Like other corpora-
tions, the earliest nonprofit-type corporations were chartered by spe-
cial acts of the states to carry out certain educational, religious, or
charitable purposes.62  Over the last few decades of the nineteenth
century, states passed general incorporation acts for nonprofits but
still imposed some restrictions on who could form these organizations
and for what purposes.63  By the middle of the twentieth century, po-
litical pressures grew to make the nonprofit corporate form more ac-
58. In theory, a corporation such as Neftegas could have an instrumental basis for constitu-
tionally protected rights under the purpose part of the analysis proposed infra, even if there is no
derivative basis for granting these rights.  See infra Part III.A.3, for a discussion of the instru-
mental rationale for granting rights to corporations.
59. See Am. Civil Liberties Union, Inc. Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax
(Form 990) (2013), https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/about/ACLU%20Form%20990%20Public%
20Disclosure%20Copy.pdf (stating the number of voting members).  Nonprofit corporations will
be discussed more generally infra under the topic of the purpose of the corporation. See infra
Part III.
60. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (Form
990) (2013), http://990s.foundationcenter.org/990_pdf_archive/530/530116130/530116130_2013
12_990O.pdf_ga=1.194253869.1017092510.1407783357 (stating the number of voting members).
61. The purpose for which the members joined together is still relevant.  The members of
Sam’s Club or American Airlines AAdvantage frequent flier program probably did not join
together for the purpose of exercising expressive rights. See infra Part II.
62. See Levy, supra note 30 (manuscript at 7–12). R
63. Id. (manuscript at 4) (“While states passed general incorporation laws for nonprofit corpo-
rations in the late nineteenth century, in many states judges retained discretion in granting non-
profit corporate charters.”).
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cessible to more people for a greater variety of purposes.  Driving this
change was a spreading belief that the right to form and join organiza-
tions with like-minded people was a right of association guaranteed by
the First Amendment.64  In the 1950s, this point was brought home in
the NAACP cases.  In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,65 the U.S.
Supreme Court held that Alabama could not compel the NAACP to
disclose the group’s membership because this would violate the mem-
bers’ freedom of association.66  In 1961, a New York court of appeals
explicitly found that individuals had the right to join similar organiza-
tions on the ground that “if ‘expression’ was ‘lawful,’ then ‘those en-
gaging in it were entitled to a vehicle for such expression.’”67
If members of a corporation are other corporations, as is the case
with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce68 and the National Collegiate
Athletic Association,69 the link to natural persons from whom an ex-
pressive right could be derived is less direct, and the presumption
should be against granting such a right on a derivative basis.70  None-
theless, there might still be a compelling argument for granting a right
to this type of corporation, but such a right would more sensibly be
granted based on an instrumental rationale tied to the purpose of the
64. Id.  (“With civil rights advocates equating access to nonprofit incorporation with ‘freedom
of association,’ by the 1970s open access was achieved.”); see also id. (manuscript at 43–45)
(“[O]nce civic-minded nonprofits, focused on membership, transformed into professionally man-
aged commercial entities.”).
65. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
66. Id. at 466; see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963) (“We conclude that al-
though the petitioner has amply shown that its activities fall within the First Amendment’s pro-
tections, the State has failed to advance any substantial regulatory interest, in the form of
substantive evils flowing from petitioner’s activities, which can justify the broad prohibitions
which it has imposed.”); John D. Inazu, The Strange Origins of the Constitutional Right of Associ-
ation, 77 TENN. L. REV. 485 (2010) (discussing the significance of NAACP cases for freedom of
association). See generally Nelson, supra note 5, at 506 (discussing the importance of freedom of R
association in the legal evolution of nonprofit corporate law).
67. Levy, supra note 30 (manuscript at 30) (citing Ass’n for the Pres. of Freedom of Choice, R
Inc. v. Shapiro, 174 N.E.2d 487, 490 (N.Y. 1961)).
68. See Join the Chamber, U.S. CHAMBER COMM., https://www.uschamber.com/members/join-
chamber (last visited Aug. 18, 2015) (“Our members range from mom-and-pop shops and local
chambers to leading industry associations and large corporations.”).
69. See About the NCAA, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about (last visited Aug. 18, 2015).
70. The rationale for granting an expressive right such as freedom of speech to the Chamber
of Commerce might be much stronger in the purpose dimension than in the people dimension
because one of its most important purposes is expressive. See U.S. CHAMBER COMMERCE,
https://www.uschamber.com (last visited Aug. 18, 2015) (“Since 1912, we’ve been fighting for
your business and looking out for your bottom line.  We are your eyes and ears here in Washing-
ton. We listen to your needs and convey your message in the political arena, taking action on
legislative issues that impact your business.”); infra Part III (discussing the purpose dimension).
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specific corporation rather than the identity of the people behind the
corporation.71
If we can identify the members of a corporation as the natural per-
sons from whom an expressive right might be derived, then we can
proceed to the next level of analysis and ask whether, given that the
members’ individual rights should be protected, granting the right to
the corporation is necessary to facilitate that purpose.72
2. Does the Corporation Represent Its Investors?
In a for-profit business corporation, one group of natural persons
that a corporation might plausibly be said to represent is the share-
holders.73  If the number of natural persons who are shareholders in a
given corporation is small, stable, and cohesive, it is conceivable that
being investors in the business of the corporation is an expressive ac-
tivity for those people.  Book stores, cafes and restaurants, newspa-
pers and magazines, art galleries, farmers markets, theaters, radio and
television stations, websites, and film production companies are exam-
ples of businesses that people sometimes engage in for the satisfaction
they provide and opportunity for community engagement or personal
expression, rather than merely for the income these businesses might
generate.  In arguing their case and challenging the requirement under
the rules promulgated to enact the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (ACA),74 which states that employers with fifty or more full-
time employees must provide access to a specified range of contracep-
tive benefits in its employee health care plan,75 the Green family,
71. Although the purpose of the Chamber of Commerce is expressive, this does not, by itself,
imply that the Court should recognize a full range of expressive rights for it.  In Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, Justice O’Connor argued in her concurring opinion that the Jaycees was a predomi-
nantly commercial organization and, therefore, only entitled to “minimal constitutional protec-
tion” of its associational activities.  468 U.S. 609, 635 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
72. See infra Part III (explaining the purpose behind corporation formation).
73. Legal scholars have long debated whether the law requires officers and directors to run
corporations solely for the benefit of shareholders.  That question is beyond the scope of this
Article.  See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 773 (2005) and Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2007), for well-articulated views on both sides of this debate.  See Mar-
garet M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV.
247 (1999), for an alternative way to frame the question of what the goals of corporate govern-
ance should be.
74. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
75. HHS promulgated regulations pursuant to the ACA requiring employers’ group health
plans to provide “preventive care and screenings” for women without any cost sharing require-
ments.  42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012).  This was further interpreted by HHS to require cov-
erage for twenty contraceptive methods that were approved by the Food and Drug
Administration, four of which have been challenged by certain religious groups on the grounds
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whose members own all shares of Hobby Lobby, claimed to operate
their business on Christian principles.76  In Hobby Lobby, the Court
noted that the Green family’s opponents presented no reasons why
the Court should reject or question that claim.77  In finding that
Hobby Lobby should be exempt from the contraceptive requirement
on the grounds that the requirement burdened the corporation’s right
to practice religion under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993,78 the Court attempted to limit the application of its finding to
closely held corporations,79 implicitly recognizing that this sort of
claim would be much more difficult to sustain in the case of a business
corporation with hundreds, or even a few dozen, shareholders and not
a credible claim at all for a publicly traded corporation.  In other
words, the argument that granting expressive rights to corporations
might be necessary to protect the expressive rights of its shareholders
is plausible if the shares are entirely owned by a small, cohesive group,
such as family members.  But, as the number of shareholders increases
and as other factors that might link those shareholders together for
expressive purposes are weakened, it becomes much less persuasive
that a corporation is a vehicle for shareholders to exercise expressive
rights and that granting expressive rights to a corporation is necessary
to protect the expressive rights of its shareholders.
This analysis would also be different for nonprofit corporations.80
Under the people analysis, I simply note that nonprofit corporations
also have investors who are more likely to be called donors.  Non-
profit corporations are distinguished from for-profit corporations by
the fact that they operate under what Henry Hansmann has called a
“nondistribution constraint,” meaning that nonprofit corporations
that the methods may prevent fertilized eggs from attaching to the uterus.  Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., S. Ct. 2751, 2762–63 (2014).
76. Id. at 2765–66.
77. Id. at 2774 (“The companies in the cases before us are closely held corporations, each
owned and controlled by members of a single family, and no one has disputed the sincerity of
their religious beliefs.”).
78. See generally Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 to -4)
79. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. passim; id. at 2774. (“[W]e have no occasion to consider
RFRA’s applicability to such [large publicly traded corporations] companies.”); see also Ste-
phen Bainbridge, What Is a “Close Corporation” for Purposes of the New Hobby Lobby Rule,
PROFESSORBAINBRIGE.COM (July 1, 2014), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbain
bridgecom/2014/07/what-is-a-close-corporation-for-purposes-of-the-new-hobby-lobby-rule.html;
Steven Davidoff Solomon, In Hobby Lobby Ruling, a Missing Definition Stirs Debate, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/02/in-hobby-lobby-ruling-a-missing-de
finition-stirs-debate/?_r=0.
80. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the way to categorize nonprofit organizations to deter-
mine if they have expressive rights).
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may not distribute assets or net income to any of the parties who con-
trol or contribute to the nonprofit but must reinvest any surplus funds
in the mission of the nonprofit.81  Thus, donors may not earn any re-
turn on their investment in a nonprofit, and it therefore seems un-
likely that individuals would donate time, money, or other things of
value to a nonprofit corporation for any reason other than to support
the mission of the nonprofit.  For this reason, being a donor to a
nonprofit is generally understood as an inherently expressive act—an
act of support for the nonprofit’s mission.82  For this type of corpora-
tion, it is easy to imagine scenarios in which it would be necessary to
recognize and protect expressive rights of the organization in order to
protect the expressive rights of its donors.  This is exactly what the
Court did in the NAACP cases.83
3. Can a Corporation Represent Its Directors and Managers?
At first, one might think that a corporation could be said to re-
present its directors and managers because those are natural persons
who are actually involved in and cause the corporation to act on a
day-to-day basis.  The question of whether a corporation should be
seen as representing the interests of its directors and managers, how-
ever, again depends on whether the directors and managers are a
small, cohesive group closely tied to the investors.  In start-up and
venture capital companies, as well as in family businesses, the business
activities that a corporation carries out may well be an expression of
the individuals who exercise leadership in the firm, just as the Green
family claims with regard to its business, Hobby Lobby.84
81. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980) (“A
nonprofit organization is, in essence, an organization that is barred from distributing its net earn-
ings, if any, to individuals who exercise control over it, such as members, officers, directors, or
trustees . . . .  Net earnings, if any, must be retained and devoted in their entirety to financing
further production of the services that the organization was formed to provide.”). There is a
sizeable literature on the tax rules defining and influencing nonprofit organizations. See, e.g.,
Evelyn Brody & Joseph J. Cordes, Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations: A Two-Edged
Sword?, in NONPROFITS AND GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT 141 (Elizabeth T.
Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2006).
82. One of the earliest U.S. Supreme Court decisions to deal with corporate rights involved
what we would today identify as a nonprofit corporation—Dartmouth College.  In this case, the
Court observed that the original charter of Dartmouth College, granted in 1769, should be un-
derstood as a contract between the crown and the donors and trustees, in which the donors
contributed land and money to create the school, and the Court found that the nonprofit corpo-
ration represented the donors. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 642 (1819)
(“The corporation is the assignee of their rights, stands in their place, and distributes their
bounty, as they would themselves have distributed it, had they been immortal.”).
83. See Levy, supra note 30 (manuscript at 33). R
84. See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
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But, when the officers and directors of a corporation are different
individuals from the investors and donors, the officers and directors
have fiduciary duties to put the best interests of the corporation ahead
of their own interests.85  In other words, directors and hired managers
are supposed to act on behalf of, and represent, the corporation.  So, it
is circular logic, and contradicts corporate law, to argue that the cor-
poration represents the officers and directors for purposes of expres-
sive rights.
4. Can a Corporation Represent Its Employees or Other
Stakeholders?
Can a corporation be said to represent the interests of its employees
for purposes of expressive rights?86  Could it represent its customers
or other stakeholders?  Here, again, there is not a simple answer that
applies to all issues and corporations.  If the corporation in question is
an employee-cooperative or a consumer-cooperative (either would
probably be organized as a noncapital stock corporation or some simi-
lar form), then it is possible that granting the corporation the right to
practice religion or speak out on political matters could facilitate po-
litical expression by the employees or consumers who are members of
the cooperative.  The analysis that would be required is similar to the
analysis of nonprofit membership corporations discussed supra.  If the
corporation in question is some type of nonprofit educational or
health care organization, such as a university or a hospital, the corpo-
ration is expected, as part of its mission, to act on behalf of its custom-
ers—the students in the case of a university or patients in the case of a
hospital.  Recognizing that these corporations have expressive rights
could facilitate and protect the expressive rights of their various
stakeholders.
However, a problem is introduced if we look to other stakeholders
in a for-profit corporation to see who the people are from whom an
expressive right for a corporation could be derived.  The problem is
85. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1998) (“A director shall discharge his
duties as a director, including his duties as a member of a committee: (1) in good faith; (2) with
the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circum-
stances; and (3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corpora-
tion.”); Id. § 8.42(a) (“An officer with discretionary authority shall discharge his duties under
that authority: (1) in good faith; (2) with the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) in a manner he reasonably believes
to be in the best interests of the corporation.”).
86. The Court in Hobby Lobby stated: “When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are
extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people,” specifically in-
cluding “shareholders, officers, and employees.”  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2751, 2768 (2014).
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that most business corporations of any significant size have many
stakeholders, and those stakeholders are likely to have competing in-
terests, at least with respect to some issues.87  A university might re-
present its students for some matters, its faculty for other matters,
and, still with respect to other matters, may represent the research or
artistic community.
When the interests of various stakeholders conflict, is it the Court’s
place to decide whose interests take precedence for purposes of an
expressive rights claim by the corporation?  To date, the Court has
skirted this issue in its jurisprudence on corporations’ expressive
rights.  In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,88 the Court de-
cided that a Massachusetts law, which imposed restrictions on the abil-
ity of for-profit corporations to make expenditures to support their
views on referendum proposals submitted to the voters  unless the is-
sue at stake “materially affect[ed] . . . the property, business or assets
of the corporation,” was unconstitutional.89  The Court acknowledged,
however, that there could be a difference of opinion between the
managers of a corporation and its shareholders (and, presumably,
among other stakeholders of the corporation as well) about political
matters.  But, the Court dismissed this concern, noting that
“[u]ltimately, shareholders may decide, through the procedures of
corporate democracy, whether their corporation should engage in de-
bate on public issues.”90  In Citizens United, the Court similarly dis-
missed the problem that shareholders might disagree with
management’s decisions about engaging in political speech.  Citing
Bellotti, the Court stated: “There is . . . little evidence of abuse that
cannot be corrected by shareholders ‘through the procedures of cor-
porate democracy.’”91  And, in Hobby Lobby, the Court stressed that
protecting the expressive right of the corporation protects “the rights
of people associated with the corporation, including shareholders, of-
ficers, and employees.”92  Then, without explanation or discussion, the
Court seems to say, in effect, that only the shareholders count: “Pro-
87. The literature on stakeholders in corporations is voluminous, and I make no attempt to
reference all of it in this Article.  See Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder
Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 65
(1995), for an introduction to the literature.
88. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
89. Id. at 768.
90. Id. at 794.
91. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 361–62 (2010) (quoting Bellotti,
435 U.S. at 794).
92. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2755 (2014).
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tecting the free-exercise rights of closely held corporations . . . pro-
tects the religious liberty of the humans who own and control them.”93
If the Court is going to rely on a derivative rationale for granting
expressive rights to corporations, it is important that it either explain
whose voice counts in deciding whether the corporation speaks for
those people (and why) or limit the types of corporations that are
granted expressive rights on a derivative basis to those corporations in
which it is clear who the corporation represents.
D. How Stable Is the Group of Natural Persons Assumed To Be
Represented by the Corporation and How Homogeneous
are the Interests of These Persons?
The fourth question that the Court should ask before deciding to
accord an expressive right to a corporation on a derivative rationale is
whether the group of people the Court believes the corporation repre-
sents is a stable group with shared interests that can plausibly be ag-
gregated and represented.  This analysis may be fairly straightforward
for a membership corporation in which we can assume that the mem-
bers: (1) joined of their own will; (2) wanted to associate with other
members for some common purpose; (3) continue to be members as
long as they continue their desire to pursue that purpose; and (4) if
they decide they no longer want to pursue that purpose, they are free
to exit.  If a membership corporation is exercising expressive rights to
advance the purpose for which the members joined, then those ex-
pressive rights should be protected to the same extent that the rights
of individual members deserve protection.  This was the analysis the
Court used in two NAACP cases involving freedom of association.94
However, many other types of corporations, both for-profit and
nonprofit, may have multiple constituencies.  Even if all of those con-
stituencies are natural persons with legitimate claims to constitutional
protections, it is not appropriate to treat a corporation as representing
all of these constituencies for the purpose of expressive rights when
their interests in the corporation conflict.  It should be incumbent on
the corporation claiming protection of an expressive right to explain
who it purports to represent, how it is possible to aggregate the inter-
93. Id.
94. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963) (finding that a corporation may assert free
speech and free assembly rights on behalf of its members); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (“[I]mmunity from state scrutiny of [petitioner’s] membership lists . . . is
here so related to the right of [petitioner’s] members to pursue their lawful private interests
privately and to associate freely with others in doing so as to come within the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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ests or preferences of that group of stakeholders, and why the inter-
ests of that group should take precedence over conflicting interests of
other stakeholders.  The Court should also consider whether the
members of that group are stable in that neither the specific people
involved nor their interests are subject to rapid change.  A publicly
traded corporation, for example, should not be allowed to claim ex-
pressive rights on behalf of day traders, high-frequency traders, and
short sellers even though all of those actors might hold a sizeable
number of the corporation’s securities for at least a brief period of
time.
III. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE
CORPORATION WAS FORMED?
The second dimension that the Court should consider in assessing
whether a particular corporation should be recognized as having a
constitutionally protected right of expression is the purpose for which
a corporation is formed.  Corporate purpose is important for two rea-
sons.  First, it goes to the issue of whether the corporation can serve,
and is serving, as a vehicle for the natural persons behind the corpora-
tion to exercise their expressive rights.  And, second, in some cases,
the Court has recognized corporations as having constitutionally pro-
tected rights for instrumental reasons—arguing that granting the right
to the corporation is a way to achieve some socially beneficial and
constitutionally significant purpose.95  Any such benefit depends on
what the purpose of the corporation is.
Categorizing corporations by purpose to determine whether the
corporation should have constitutional protection for expressive activ-
ities may, at first, seem like a dangerous exercise in regulating the
content of corporate expression.  But, some of the distinctions I dis-
cuss infra have already been made in the law and will seem familiar,
and some others could easily be made without regulating the content
of corporate speech.
A. Does Granting an Expressive Right to a Corporation Serve some
Important Social Function?
To answer the question posed in this Section, we must consider the
corporate purposes for which courts  have recognized an instrumental
rationale for granting expressive rights to corporations.
95. Blair & Pollman, supra note 4, at 1726 (arguing that the Court has generally granted rights R
to corporations either derivatively or for instrumental reasons).
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1. Media Corporations
The Court has used an instrumental rationale for recognizing claims
of freedom of press or freedom of speech for media companies and
for other corporations that have an explicitly expressive purpose.96
The Court has repeatedly recognized, for example, that newspaper
publishers, book publishers, film production companies, theaters, and
other similar organizations must have protected constitutional rights
to produce and publish the journalistic or artistic products of their
employees and others to protect the First Amendment rights of indi-
vidual writers, editors, scholars, commentators, and artists.  Universi-
ties, colleges, or organizations formed for the advancement of science,
the arts, or sports are also in the business of disseminating expression
as well as fostering debate and discussion.  These organizations are
primary mechanisms through which natural persons exercise their
rights to speak, write, publish, and disseminate their views, whether
those views are scientific, religious, artistic, athletic, or political.  It
clearly furthers the purpose of the First Amendment for these kinds of
organizations to be granted freedom of speech and freedom of press.
There is a rich history of case law affirming that media corporations
have constitutional protection for freedom of speech and freedom of
press.97  As suggested by the examples mentioned supra, media corpo-
rations can be both nonprofit and for-profit, but the distinction does
not matter for determining the appropriateness of granting expressive
96. In many cases the Court has recognized that the First Amendment must protect media
corporations so that they can carry out their function. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC,
520 U.S. 180, 218  (1997) (establishing that cable television companies were protected speakers
under the First Amendment); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975) (finding that a
Georgia statute prohibiting the release of a rape victim’s name and its common-law privacy
action counterpart were unconstitutional limits on freedom of press); Se. Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975) (finding that the City of Chattanooga’s denial of the request by
Southeastern Promotions to stage the musical “Hair” in the Tivoli theater amounted to “prior
restraint” and impeded freedom of speech of Southeastern Promotions, a corporation); Miami
Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (finding that a Florida state law requiring
newspapers to allow equal space in their newspapers to political candidates if they endorse a
particular candidate violates the constitutional principle of freedom of press); N.Y. Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (finding that the freedom of press rights of the New York
Times Co. superseded § 793 of the Espionage Act, making it criminal to publish information the
possessor had reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States—in this case, the
Pentagon Papers); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964) (establishing that free-
dom of press rights protected the newspaper against defamation and libel claims when reporting
on the actions of public officials if there was no actual malice); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297
U.S. 233, 251 (1936) (holding unconstitutional a state license tax imposed on newspaper corpora-
tions selling advertising as an impermissible abridgment of speech or of the press.). Citizens
United cited these and a number of other cases as support for the proposition that “First Amend-
ment protection extends to corporations.”  558 U.S. at 342.
97. See supra note 96 (discussing these cases). R
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rights to these corporations.  Importantly, the Court has not had a dif-
ficult time identifying the corporations that need protection on these
grounds, and scholars and commentators have not expressed concerns
that granting First Amendment rights to media companies will corrupt
the political process or lead to other social harms.  However, an im-
portant problem in granting expressive rights to media corporations is
the difficulty of distinguishing media corporations from other corpora-
tions.  In fact, the Court in Citizens United denied that this distinction
should matter.98
2. Commercial Speech
The other context in which the Court has granted freedom of
speech and press rights to corporations for instrumental reasons are
the cases involving commercial speech.  In those cases, the Court has
found that regulations limiting the information that corporations can
publish about the characteristics and prices of the products and ser-
vices they sell deprives consumers of access to information they need
to make decisions in the marketplace.  Thus, these regulations have
been struck down.  In these cases, the Court has recognized that the
selling corporation has the right to publish information for the instru-
mental purpose of enriching the information that is available in the
market and because potential customers have the right to hear and
learn about that information.99
3. Is There an Instrumental Rationale for Corporate Political
Speech?
The Court used an instrumental argument in Bellotti and Citizens
United, arguing that the First Amendment protects speech without re-
gard to who the speaker is.100  In the commercial speech cases in
98. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 352.  (“There is no precedent supporting laws that attempt to
distinguish between corporations which are deemed to be exempt as media corporations and
those which are not.”).  This could become more of a problem in the future.  In the age of the
Internet, as more corporations interact with suppliers, customers, and even their own employees
over the Internet, and as more of the products that these companies sell are intangible products
(e.g., brand, image, information, analysis, interactive games, and presentation packages), com-
mercial speech is almost completely unregulated.  A great deal of commercial speech, commen-
tary, and visual material goes out anonymously, and corporations spend a substantial amount of
time and resources trying to keep confidential information from going out and limiting the dam-
age from negative information that does go out.  “With the advent of the Internet and the de-
cline of print and broadcast media, moreover, the line between the media and others who wish
to comment on political and social issues becomes far more blurred.” Id.
99. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 US. 748,
772–73 (1976).
100. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 341 (“The First Amendment protects speech and speaker,
and the ideas that flow from each.”).  “Political speech does not lose First Amendment protec-
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL212.txt unknown Seq: 24  2-AUG-16 9:34
276 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:253
which this argument first appeared, there was no question about
whether potential customers would know the source of the informa-
tion that the corporations wanted to publish.  This was also true for
the instrumental rationale regarding freedom of speech and press for
media companies.  The Court did not have to consider the impact of
commercial information going into the marketplace of ideas without
attribution or other information for readers and listeners about the
source of the information and commentary.  In the realm of political
discussion and debate, however, this is not necessarily the case.  In
2011, Walmart funded a misleadingly named organization, “Littleton
Neighbors Voting No,” to fight a ballot measure in Colorado that
would have kept it from opening a new store.101  This confused voters
rather than adding to the mix of information they could use to make a
fair and intelligent decision.  This is a significant problem for the in-
strumental rationale supporting political speech because the ability of
corporate speech to enrich the insights and perspectives available to
potential voters, and not deceive readers and listeners, corrupt the
democratic process, or obfuscate the issues, critically depends on read-
ers’ and listeners’ ability to determine the sources of the political in-
formation or commentary.
This example points to one of the most troubling concerns about
the Court’s decision in Citizens United: it undermines campaign fi-
nance regulations designed to ensure that readers and listeners of po-
litical speech know, or can easily find out, who or which people,
corporations, or special interests are responsible for publishing the
speech.  Corporations, labor organizations, federal government con-
tractors, and foreign nationals are all prohibited from making direct
contributions to candidates for federal office or to national, state, or
local party committees.102  These organizations are allowed to form
tion ‘simply because its source is a corporation.’” Id. at 342 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978)).
101. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy recounted the story of this happening in comments she provided to
the Securities and Exch. Comm’n when it was considering the rules that would require publicly
traded corporations to report their political spending. See Comments of Ciara Torres-Spilliscy
Assistant Professor of Law at Stetson University College of Law Before the Sec. and Exchange
Commission Regarding Petition File No. 4-637, at 10 (2011), http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/
4637-13.pdf; Angela Migally, Coloradans’ Right To Know, DENV. POST, http://
www.denverpost.com/headlines/ci_13827296 (last updated Nov. 20, 2009, 12:01 PM).
102. See 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a) (2012) (“It is unlawful for any national bank, or . . . . any corpo-
ration whatsoever, or any labor organization, to make a contribution or expenditure in connec-
tion with any election [of the presidential and vice presidential electors or a Senator or a
Congressperson].”); Id. § 30119 (“It shall be unlawful for any person—(1) who enters into any
contract with the United States . . . to make any contribution of money or other things of value,
or to promise expressly or impliedly to make such contribution to any political party, committee,
or candidate for public office . . . .”); id. § 30121(a) (“It shall be unlawful for—(1) a foreign
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“political action committees” (PACs), which can raise voluntary con-
tributions from specified classes of individuals (generally shareholders
and managers of the corporation sponsoring the PAC in the case of a
corporation or members in the case of a union or other interest group)
and use the funds to directly support candidates and party commit-
tees.103  PACs that are independent from corporations or other organi-
zations can also contribute to candidate campaigns.104  But PACs, just
like other political committees, are subject to limits on how much
money any organization or individual can contribute to them as well
as how much they can contribute to any individual candidate’s cam-
paign.105  They are also required to periodically file reports with the
Federal Election Commission, reporting the names of every individual
(or other political committee) who contributed more than $200 in an
election cycle.106  Thus, campaign finance laws try to regulate direct
contributions to parties’ and candidates’ campaigns.
One of the effects of Citizens United, however, was the elimination
of restrictions on corporations’ and unions’ abilities to make what are
called “independent expenditures” to support a candidate for election
as long as their expenditures are not coordinated with the campaign or
the party.107  Organizations quickly emerged to undertake this kind of
activity.  These organizations are officially called “independent-expen-
diture only committees” or, unofficially, “Super PACs.”  Super PACs
are required to report the sources of the funds they spend on election
national, directly or indirectly, to make—(A) a contribution or donation of money or other thing
of value, or to make an express or implied promise to make a contribution or donation, in con-
nection with a Federal, State, or local election;  (B) a contribution or donation to a committee of
a political party; or (C) an expenditure, independent expenditure, or disbursement for an elec-
tioneering communication . . . .”).
103. Id. § 30118(b)(2)(C) (“[Restrictions on contributions by corporations, labor organiza-
tions and other specified organizations] shall not include . . . (C) the establishment, administra-
tion, and solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for political
purposes by a corporation, labor organization, membership organization, cooperative, or corpo-
ration without capital stock.”).  “Political action committees” (PACs) are the popular name for
these separately segregated funds.
104. PACs are regulated in the same way that other political committees are regulated. See,
e.g., id. § 30102 (organization); id. § 30103 (registration requirements); id. § 30104 (reporting
requirements).
105. Id. § 30116 (limiting contributions and expenditures).  These are summarized as applied
to the 2015–2016 federal elections in The FEC and the Federal Campaign Finance Law, FED.
ELECTION COMM’N, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/fecfeca.shtml#Contribution_Limits (last
updated Jan. 2015).
106. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(3).
107. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 312 (2010) (“Austin is over-
ruled, so it provides no basis for allowing the Government to limit corporate independent ex-
penditures. . . .  [Hence,] Section 441b’s restrictions on [these] expenditures are . . . invalid
. . . .”).
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campaigns.108  But, in addition to Super PAC spending, existing and
new § 501(c) organizations, as well as for-profit corporations, also be-
gan spending substantial amounts of money on “independent expendi-
tures.”  These organizations are not required to reveal their
membership or sources of funding to the public, and there is no legal
limit as to how much they can raise or spend under campaign finance
laws.109  The effect has been to flood the “marketplace of ideas” with
political speech while simultaneously demolishing the rules that were
intended to provide voters with key information they need to fully
understand and evaluate that political speech.  For example, according
to Public Citizen, a nonprofit public interest advocacy group, the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce (a § 501(c)(6) organization) was the largest
overall spender in the 2014 congressional races.110  The Chamber does
not reveal which of its members provide the funds for the organization
to support its independent expenditures.  And, a growing list of orga-
nizations with completely uninformative names that are also not re-
quired to reveal their sources of funds, like Crossroads GPS, Patriot
Majority USA, American Action Network, and Americans for Pros-
perity, also made the list of top ten “nondisclosing” organizations in
terms of spending on congressional elections in 2014.111
Although the Court in Citizens United recognized the importance of
providing voters with information about the source of political
speech,112 there is currently no mechanism that can ensure adequate
108. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(a)(4) (“All political committees other than authorized committees of a
candidate shall [file reports] . . . .”); id. § 30104(b) (“Each report under this section shall dis-
close—. . . (3) the identification of each—(A) person (other than a political committee) who
makes a contribution to the reporting committee during the reporting period, whose contribu-
tion or contributions have an aggregate amount or value in excess of $200 . . . .”).
109. Section 501(c)(3) organizations may not engage in political speech, but § 501(c)(4) orga-
nizations and other § 501(c) tax-exempt organizations may make unlimited independent expend-
itures under Citizens United.  These organizations (if they have annual receipts greater than
$50,000) are required to report their sources of funds to the IRS in their Form 990 filings, but
they are not required to share this information with the public; in fact, they can redact the names
of donors when they make their Form 990 public.  All organizations that are tax exempt must file
Form 990 annually, or they may lose their tax-exempt status. See generally Return of Organiza-
tion Exempt from Income Tax (Form 990) (2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf.  Al-
though § 501(c)(4) organizations are not subject to absolute limits on how much they can spend
on independent expenditures, if they spend enough money they will no longer meet the require-
ment that the organization’s “primary activities” are “social welfare,” and, thus, they can lose
their tax-exempt status. See JOHN FRANCIS REILLY ET AL., IRC 501(c)(4) ORGANIZATIONS I-25
(2003), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopici03.pdf (last visited Aug. 4. 2015).
110. See SAM JEWLER, PUB. CITIZEN, THE DARK SIDE OF CITIZENS UNITED 5 (Oct. 29, 2014),
http://www.citizen.org/documents/us-chamber-of-commerce-dark-money-spending-report.pdf.
111. Id.
112. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319 (“The Government may regulate corporate political
speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that speech
altogether.”).
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disclosure of the true source of expenditures in support of (or attack-
ing) political candidates.  Additionally, because of the opaqueness of
so much political spending, it may be difficult to ensure that foreign
organizations and citizens are not pouring money into political activi-
ties.113  But, some of the language in its decision appears to close off
obvious ways of preventing that from happening.  It is up to Congress
to find a way to write the rules to limit these abuses without simply
criminalizing corporate independent expenditures.
4. An Instrumental Rationale for Other Kinds of Expressive Rights?
Because we have been considering expressive rights broadly, it is
worth pointing out that the instrumental rationale cannot be used to
explain or justify grants of freedom of assembly or free exercise of
religion to corporations.  The instrumental rationale can only be used
to justify rights whose benefits extend to parties other than the parties
who are exercising the rights, such as the citizens and voters who have
access to a wider range of viewpoints.  The benefits of freedom of as-
sembly and freedom to exercise religion inure primarily, if not com-
pletely, to the parties who exercise those rights.  So, in considering
whether a corporation should have either of these rights, we must
look at who the corporation is thought to represent.
B. Does the Corporation Itself Have an
Explicitly Expressive Purpose?
An alternative instrumental rationale for granting expressive rights
to corporations would be that the basic purpose of the corporation is
expressive.  This rationale provides an alternative basis for recogniz-
ing media corporations as having expressive rights, but this Section
addresses a different way to categorize corporations when considering
whether they should have expressive rights:  (1) Nonprofit corpora-
tions; (2) for-profit corporations and other entities that have few or no
employees and that exist solely to hold or invest in certain assets; and
(3) for-profit, nonmedia corporations that are actively operating a
business.
1. Nonprofit Corporations
It should not be difficult for courts to distinguish between nonprofit
and for-profit corporations.  The distinction is well established in the
113. In Citizens United, the Court declined to address this problem. Id. at 362 (“We need not
reach the question whether the Government has a compelling interest in preventing foreign
individuals or associations from influencing our Nation’s political process.”).
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law, and much finer distinctions have been drawn within the category
of nonprofits regarding the kinds of political activities these corpora-
tions can carry out.114
Congress and state legislatures have recognized a distinction be-
tween for-profit and not-for-profit corporations since the late nine-
teenth century.115  An 1874 Pennsylvania statute divided all
corporations into three categories according to their tax status: (1) re-
ligious corporations, which were exempt from property taxes; (2) for-
profit business corporations, which were taxable; and (3) “not-for-
profit” corporations, which were exempt from taxes.116
Today, the tax rules governing categories of tax-exempt corpora-
tions are quite complex, but for purposes of this Article, it is sufficient
to note the basic rule: a corporation does not have to pay federal taxes
on net income if it is organized for certain purposes or carries out
certain types of activities and if it maintains the necessary records and
files the necessary forms with the IRS.117  The tax code provides for
several categories of corporations that are tax exempt.  Corporations
organized under § 501(c)(3) do not have to pay federal taxes on net
income, and, under § 509(a) and § 170(b), donors who contribute re-
sources to these corporations may be able to take a deduction for
their contributions from their income for purposes of computing fed-
eral income taxes.  Contributors to corporations organized under
§ 501(c)(4)–(c)(28) may not take a tax deduction for their contribu-
tions, dues, or membership fees, but the corporation itself is exempt
from paying taxes on its net income.
The designated purposes under § 501(c)(3) include: “religious, char-
itable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational pur-
poses, or to foster national or international  amateur sports
114. For a discussion regarding categories of nonprofit corporations in the tax code, under
I.R.C. § 501(c) (2012), see infra notes 124–28 and accompanying text.
115. This distinction was briefly touched on in Part II supra. See supra notes 45–54 and ac- R
companying text; see also Nelson, supra note 38, at 1575–86 (articulating a “‘social theory’ of R
conscience” and applying that theory to the distinction between religious organizations and for-
profit business corporations); Nelson, supra note 5, at 512–13 (discussing the policy issues at R
stake in the law’s distinction between nonprofit and for profit corporations); Levy, supra note 30 R
(manuscript at 4) (describing the development of laws at both the state and federal level that
distinguished nonprofit corporations from ordinary business corporations); Pollman, supra note
5 (manuscript at 39) (discussing the legal distinction between for-profit business corporations R
and nonprofit corporations).
116. See Levy, supra note 30 (manuscript at 9) (citing Peter Dobkin Hall, A Historical Over- R
view of Philanthropy, Voluntary Association, and Nonprofit Orgs. in the United States,
1600–2000, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 32, 37 (Walter W. Powell &
Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006)).
117. Nonprofit organizations must file Form 990 annually with the IRS as part of their tax
returns. See I.R.C. §501(c); Nelson, supra note 38. R
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competition . . . or for the prevention of cruelty to children or ani-
mals.”118  For corporations carrying out these activities, this Section
further requires that no private shareholder or other individual exer-
cising control over the corporation may receive a personal benefit
from the corporation.119  This rule has been called the “nondistribu-
tion constraint.”120 Although many corporations can be said to facili-
tate human expression by their employees, members, donors, or other
constituents, Congress has imposed limits on the kinds of expression
these corporations may engage in if they are to retain their full tax
advantages.  In particular,
no substantial part of the activities of [§ 501(c)(3) corporations may
involve] carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influ-
ence legislation . . . [and the corporation must] not participate in, or
intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements),
any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candi-
date for public office.121
Thus, Congress has recognized that many nonprofit corporations
act as vehicles for human expression, but it has also decided that they
should not benefit from a tax subsidy if they are used for lobbying or
to advance political or partisan agendas.  In Regan v. Taxation with
Representation of Washington122 (TRW), the U.S. Supreme Court af-
firmed that denying tax-exempt status to a corporation does not
amount to suppressing that corporation’s free speech.  “The Code
does not deny TRW the right to receive deductible contributions to
support its nonlobbying activity, nor does it deny TRW any indepen-
dent benefit on account of its intention to lobby,” the Court said.
“Congress has merely refused to pay for the lobbying out of public
moneys.”123
Corporations organized under § 501(c)(4) include civic leagues “not
organized for profit,” social welfare organizations, and “local associa-
tions of employees.”124  Section 501(c)(5) covers “labor, agricultural,
118. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
119. Id. (“[N]o part of [their] net earnings . . . inures to the benefit of any private shareholder
or individual . . . .”).
120. It has generally been interpreted to mean that the corporation may not pay dividends or
distribute its net income or assets to its donors or employees. See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note
81, at 838. R
121. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
122. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
123. Id. at 545.  Some scholars and commentators have argued that Citizens United now super-
sedes Regan so that even § 501(c)(3) corporations should be free to speak out on political ques-
tions and endorse candidates for public office. See, e.g., Paul Weitzel, Protecting Speech from the
Heart: How Citizens United Strikes Down Political Speech Restrictions on Churches and Chari-
ties, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 155, 174 (2011).  But, the Court has not yet addressed this question.
124. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4).
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or horticultural organizations”;125  Section 501(c)(6) covers “business
leagues, chambers of commerce, real-estate boards, boards of trade,
or professional football leagues . . . not organized for profit. . . .;126
Section 501(c)(7) covers “clubs organized for pleasure, recreation, and
other nonprofitable purposes”;127  and Section 501(c)(8) covers “fra-
ternal beneficiary societies, orders, or associations.”128  And, a long
list of other voluntary associations and mutual insurance companies
are covered in the higher numbered subsections of § 501(c).  These
other categories of nonprofit organizations do not have to pay taxes
on net income, but donors do not receive a tax deduction for their
donation.  Since Citizens United, these firms are not subject to restric-
tions on their ability to engage in political activity by making indepen-
dent expenditures.
The line drawing that has been done in the tax code does not di-
rectly address the issue of purpose that should be addressed in U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence on corporate constitutional rights,
which is whether the corporation facilitates expression by the natural
persons behind the corporation.  But, it is already a well-established
distinction in the law that does reasonably well in this regard.129  The
activities of  § 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporations organized to serve re-
ligious, educational, literary, or scientific purposes are clearly about
facilitating various forms of human expression.  Sections 501(c)(4),
(c)(5), and (c)(6) corporations generally have purposes related to
freedom of association and advocate for the interests of their mem-
bers, so these categories of corporations can also be understood as
facilitating expression by their members.  Moreover, the nonprofit sta-
tus of these corporations means that their expressive goals can credi-
bly take precedence over financial or economic goals because their
special tax status means that they may not pay out their net income to
donors or employees.130  This reduces the possibility that any of the
participants might have an incentive to allow financial or economic
goals to trump the expressive goals of the organizations.131
125. Id.§ 501(c)(5).
126. Id. § 501(c)(6).
127. Id. § 501(c)(7).
128. Id. § 501(c)(8).
129. See Nelson, supra note 5, at 464 (concluding that the factors that distinguish nonprofits R
from for-profit corporations do a reasonable job of distinguishing corporations for whom mem-
bership, or participation in is “closely connected with their members’ personal identities”).
130. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (stating a firm’s net earnings in this category may not “benefit . . .
any private shareholder or individual”).
131. Hansmann, supra note 81, at 838; Nelson, supra note 5, at 506 (noting that the nondis- R
tribution constraint “instantiates a widely accepted norm of behavior in the nonprofit sector.
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It should be recognized that there are some nonprofit corporations
that are not organized for expressive purposes.  A credit union or in-
surance company organized (under I.R.C. § 501(c)(14) or
§ 501(c)(15)) for teachers and employees of a school system is an ex-
ample.  A mutual insurance company or credit union can reasonably
be understood to represent its members for certain financial purposes
but not for political expression.
Aside from these special cases, it has long been recognized that
nonprofit corporations are organized for the purpose of facilitating
various kinds of expression by their members, donors, employees, and
customers.  The presumption should be that these corporations should
receive constitutional protections for their expressive activities unless
there is a public purpose reason to deny this protection.132
2. Corporations and Other Types of Business Entities That Are
Passive Investment Vehicles Controlled Entirely
by Another Corporation
This Section discusses another category that includes holding com-
panies, special purpose vehicles, and other corporations and LLCs or-
ganized to be passive holders of assets with no operations and few or
no employees.  Examples of corporations organized as passive invest-
ment vehicles include: (1) special purpose entities used by financial
firms in the securitization of financial assets133 and (2) subsidiaries of
operating corporations that are chartered in low-tax states by the op-
erating firm to be the owner of its intellectual property.134  These cor-
porations typically have no employees except, perhaps, a single agent
who is primarily an employee of the control company.  They may have
creditors and shareholders, but it is highly unlikely that these will be
That norm . . . is one of shared commitment to the mission of the organization rather than the
production of private financial benefit”).
132. For example, it might be possibile that granting freedom of speech to an organization
that can accept unlimited tax-subsidized dollars is likely to corrupt the political process.  This is
similar, however, to the antidistortion rationale for limits on corporate independent expendi-
tures rejected by Citizens United. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310,
313 (2010) (“Neither Austin’s antidistortion rationale, nor the Government’s other justifications
support § 441b’s restrictions.”).
133. See Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1655, 1663 (2004); Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special
Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309, 1314 (2002); Steven L.
Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 135 (1994).
134. See MICHAEL  MAZEROV, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, STATE CORPORATE
TAX SHELTERS AND THE NEED FOR “COMBINED REPORTING” 1 (Oct. 26, 2007), http://www.cbpp
.org//archiveSite/10-26-07sfp.pdf; Charles Duhigg & David Kocieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps
Billions in Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/business/ap
ples-tax-strategy-aims-at-low-tax-states-and-nations.html?_r=1.
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natural persons.  These corporations have, as their primary business
purpose, the partitioning of assets for tax or liability purposes, and
they cannot credibly be said to facilitate expression by any natural
persons.135
3. Nonmedia, For-Profit Business Corporations That Are Actual
Operating Companies136
In the wake of the Citizens United and Hobby Lobby decisions,
some commentators have argued that we should rule out the possibil-
ity that any for-profit corporations could have expressive rights guar-
anteed under the Constitution.137  But, like nonprofit corporations,
for-profit corporations exist for a variety of different purposes.  The
question of whether they should be granted First Amendment rights
should depend on whether their purpose is to facilitate expression by
an identifiable group of people behind the corporation.  The following
is an attempt to identify how these lines might be drawn.138
a. Dual-Purpose Corporations
The argument that the purpose of a for-profit corporation (other
than a media company) might be to facilitate expression by natural
persons associated with the corporation is probably strongest for dual-
purpose corporations, such as “social enterprise” firms, which use
commercial strategies to carry out business activities for the benefit of
the public,139 or “benefit corporations,” which are corporations that
state in their charters that their purpose is to have some positive im-
pact on society or the environment in addition to making profits.140
135. If the question ever came up, I can see no rationale whatsoever for granting expressive
rights to these corporations.
136. See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing media corporations).
137. See, e.g., Stephen A. Justino, Yes on Amendment 65, but . . ., DENVER POST: IDEA LOG
FOR OPINION (Sept. 28, 2012, 4:39 PM), http://blogs.denverpost.com/opinion/2012/09/28/amend
ment-65/26184/.
138. The categories of corporations that I delineate in this Section are not necessarily well
defined in the law or mutually exclusive.  For example, Hobby Lobby is a for-profit, operating
company but has some characteristics that make it similar to what I call a “dual-purpose” corpo-
ration. See infra notes 139–44 and accompanying text. R
139. “Social enterprise” is a broad term that includes some nonprofit organizations as well as
some corporations that are legally for-profit firms.
140. Delaware General Corporate Law Section 362 defines a “public benefit corporation” as
a for-profit corporation . . . that is intended to produce a public benefit or public bene-
fits and to operate in a responsible and sustainable manner. . . .  [It] shall be managed in
a manner that balances the stockholders’ pecuniary interests, the best interests of those
materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the public benefit or public bene-
fits identified in its certificate of incorporation.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 362 (2014).
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Benefit corporations may be organized under special sections of cor-
porate statutes in thirty-one different states that have these statutes.141
Officers and directors of these corporations have duties to pursue
these special purposes in addition to earning profits for shareholders,
and the shareholders and other investors are assumed to know that
the corporation has made these commitments at the time that they
chose to invest in the corporation.
Other types of business corporations that fit into this category are
corporations whose shares are entirely owned by charitable founda-
tions, such as Newman’s Own, Inc., which contributes all of its annual
profits to the Newman’s Own Foundation.142  Additionally, Hobby
Lobby arguably fits into this category, although its shares are held not
by a family-run charitable foundation but by a trust for members of
the Green family143 who have made a commitment to donate a certain
percentage of profits to charity.144  These corporations were estab-
lished to operate for-profit businesses and to utilize the profits from
the businesses to support some public or charitable cause.  Investors,
employees, and customers of these corporations can be assumed to be
aware of this special purpose.  Thus, it is reasonable to believe that
dual-purpose corporations may facilitate expression by people behind
the corporation, many or all of whom participate, at least partly, be-
cause they want to show support for that purpose.
Although their avowed dual missions suggest that these corpora-
tions might reasonably claim to represent a number of different natu-
ral persons for some expressive purposes (other than just to earn a
profit), given the difficulties of aggregating diverse interests the pre-
sumption should be against granting rights to these corporations de-
rivatively.  However, there may be instrumental reasons for granting
expressive rights to this type of corporation.
b. Nonmedia, For-profit Operating Corporations with Many
Investors and Employees
This final category is the one most people probably think about
when they have reflexively criticized the Citizens United and Hobby
141. See State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/policymak-
ers/state-by-state-status (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
142. See NEWMAN’S OWN, http://www.newmansown.com/charity/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
143. The supporting documents in Hobby Lobby do not explain the purpose of the family
trust, but this is probably a tax shelter device. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 2 n.3, Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), 2014 WL 546899.
144. However, that commitment may not be legally binding, so this is not a clear case.
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Lobby decisions.145  Examples of nonmedia, for-profit corporations
range from giant publicly traded corporations, such as ExxonMobil,
Walmart, Nike, Pfizer, and Intel, to lesser-known publicly traded cor-
porations, such as United Natural Foods, Inc.,146 and, lastly, to pri-
vately held companies, such as FastMed Urgent Care.147  These
corporations may have lofty mission statements148 and may, in fact,
claim to serve many stakeholders,149  however, widely traded corpora-
tions notoriously face pressures to focus on short-term profits even at
the expense of other goals.150  And, even if the company’s shares trade
privately (as did FastMed’s shares until very recently), an outside in-
145. See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV.
581, 622–23 (2011); John Wellington Ennis, Outrage over Citizens United Has Jump-Started a
Revolution, TAKEPART (Jan. 21 2015), http://www.takepart.com/article/2015/01/21/unexpected-
upside-citizens-united; Liz Kennedy, Top 5 Ways Citizens United Harms Democracy & Top 5
Ways We’re Fighting To Take Democracy Back, DC¸MOS (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.demos.org/
publication/top-5-ways-citizens-united-harms-democracy-top-5-ways-we%E2%80%99re-fight-
ing-take-democracy-back; Lawrence Lessig, An Open Letter to the Citizens Against Citizens
United, ATLANTIC (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/03/an-open-
letter-to-the-citizens-against-citizens-united/254902/; and Michael Peppard, Citizens United:
Time for Outrage, COMMONWEAL MAG., July 16, 2012, https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/
blog/citizens-united-time-outrage, for popular criticisms of the Citizens United decision.  John C.
Coates IV examined the impact of the Citizens United decision on publicly traded corporations
and found that after the decision, “corporate lobbying and PAC activity jumped, in both fre-
quency and amount.”  John C. Coates IV, Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before and
After Citizens United, 9 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 657 (2012).
146. United Natural Foods is a publicly traded company with shares trading on the NASDAQ.
Investor Overview, UNFI, http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=93228&p=irol-irhome
(last updated Aug. 15, 2015).
147. See Reuel Heyden, FastMed Urgent Care and Family Practice Holds Grand Opening,
Welcomes Sidney Wolinksy PA, FASTMED.COM (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.fastmed.com/about-
fastmed/fastmed-news/fastmed-urgent-care-and-family-practice-holds-grand-opening-welcomes-
sidney-wolinsky-pa (“FastMed Urgent Care and Family Clinic is one of the only privately held
Joint Commission Accredited Urgent Care Companies in North Carolina.”).
148. United Natural Foods, Inc., for example, says its mission is “to exceed the needs and
expectations of all our stakeholders: our customers, associates, natural and specialty product
consumers, suppliers, shareholders, communities, the environment and the planet.” Vision and
Mission, UNFI, https://www.unfi.com/Company/Pages/VisionAndMission.aspx (last visited Aug.
17, 2015).
149. FastMed Urgent Care claims that its mission is “to serve [its] communities and patients
with a high level of quality, personal care, affordable and convenient urgent care, family practice
and other specialty medicine services.” Mission Statement, FASTMED, http://www.fastmed.com/
about-fastmed/mission-statement (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
150. See WILLIAM A. GALSTON & ELAINE C. KARMARCK, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PUB. MGMT.
AT BROOKINGS, MORE BUILDERS AND FEWER TRADERS:  A GROWTH STRATEGY FOR THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY 8 (June 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/
2015/06/30-american-economy-growth-strategy-galston-kamarck/cepmglastonkarmarck4.pdf
(discussing a variety of evidence from corporations focusing excessively on quarterly profits and
failing to adequately invest for long-term growth).
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vestor could acquire enough shares to control these corporations151
and compel the corporation to focus on maximizing profits and share
value even at the expense of other goals the prior management might
have been pursuing.
With these corporations, it is hard to make a convincing argument
that they can represent any particular group of natural persons for
expressive purposes unless one regards profit maximization as an ex-
pressive activity.  It is not credible that this type of corporation serves
to facilitate the speech of its human participants if its agents, in caus-
ing the corporation to act, speak out on political issues unrelated to
the business of the corporation, or attempt to use the corporation to
promote political views or to exercise religion.  The presumption for
nonmedia, for-profit corporations, especially for corporations whose
shares trade widely should, therefore, be that they do not represent
any particular group of natural persons for expressive purposes not
directly related to the business interests of the corporation.
Nonetheless, corporations that pursue for-profit businesses are
likely to gain special knowledge about a variety of issues.  That knowl-
edge is appropriately regarded as the knowledge of the corporation
itself, especially if it has been codified, recorded, and disseminated
within the corporation, or embedded in the routines and procedures
of the corporation.152  When such a corporation speaks through its
agents, or engages in other expressive acts (publishing, promoting, ad-
vertising, testifying), it may be appropriate to assume that it repre-
sents the interests of its participants as long as it is speaking on
matters relating to its business for which it actually has special exper-
tise.  Moreover, when the corporation has knowledge from its re-
search or experience, the public discourse is, or can be, enhanced
when that corporation speaks out about that knowledge.  These cor-
porations should have constitutionally protected rights to speak about
or publish matters in which they have expertise directly obtained
from, or related to, their technology and business experience.  The ra-
tionale for this has nothing to do with the rights of natural persons
151. In June 2015, FastMed announced that the private equity firm, ABRY Partners, acquired
control of the corporation.  Angela Gonzales, Equity Firm Closes FastMed Urgent Care Acquisi-
tion, PHX. BUS. J., http://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/blog/health-care-daily/2015/06/equity-
firm-closes-fastmed-urgent-care-acquisition.html (last updated June 17, 2015, 4:04 PM).
152. RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC
CHANGE 14 (1982) (arguing that corporations embed specialized knowledge into the routines
that their employees carry out); see also Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of
Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Expression and the Corporation after First National
Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347, 1359–60 (1979) (analyzing the cases involving corporations
wishing to assert First Amendment rights to protect expression, which is part of their business).
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represented by the corporation, all of whom have individual rights
protected by the Constitution to speak out, to tell their individual sto-
ries, and express their opinions.
IV. WHERE CORPORATE RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE
SHOULD GO NOW
Citizens United and Hobby Lobby will not be the last words on cor-
porate constitutional rights, if only because it is highly unlikely that
the Court will follow the implications of some of the more extreme
statements in Citizens United.  For example, Richard Hasen argues
that the Court will probably not strike down “reasonable limits on
campaign contributions made directly to candidates, allow spending
by foreign nationals to influence candidate elections [or] to treat
spending in judicial elections the same way as spending for other
races.”153  Subsequent cases will also likely test the boundaries of the
Hobby Lobby decision.
The analysis in this Article addresses the line drawing that must be
done when the Court considers future questions about expressive
rights in the name of a corporation.  When a corporation can credibly
be understood as representing the interests of natural persons who,
individually, have valid claims to First Amendment protections and
who associated with the corporation for some expressive purpose, the
right of the corporation to carry out that expressive activity should be
protected by the First Amendment.  Americans for Tax Reform154 and
Citizens United for Tax Justice155 should have fully protected rights to
freedom of speech, freedom of press, and freedom of association156
for activities pursuant to their missions157 because these organizations
153. See Hasen, supra note 145, at 585. But see McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. R
Ct. 1434 (2014) (striking down aggregate limits on how much money an individual donor may
contribute to candidates or committees); Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490,
2492 (2012) (per curiam) (expanding the Citizens United ruling regarding independent expendi-
tures by striking down state-level limits on corporate spending on elections).
154. See generally About, AMS. FOR TAX REFORM, http://www.atr.org/about (last visited Aug.
17, 2015) (describing the Americans for Tax Reform organization, which “opposes all tax in-
creases as a matter of principle”).
155. See generally Background and History, CITIZENS FOR TAX JUST., http://ctj.org/about/
background.php (last visited Aug. 17, 2015) (describing the Citizens for Tax Justice’s mission to
“give ordinary people a greater voice in the development of tax laws” and fight against “armies
of special interest lobbyists for corporations and the wealthy”).
156. And, if some hypothetical organization were created to advocate for the idea that consci-
entious believers of some religion should resist paying taxes because paying taxes is a form of
idolatry, that organization should be free to “practice” religion by advocating against paying
taxes.
157. See supra notes 154–55, for the websites that provide the mission of each organization. R
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plausibly represent their donors and other supporters by speaking out
on tax issues.
This basis for granting constitutional rights to corporations is a de-
rivative rationale.  Corporations’ rights are derived from the rights of
some group of natural persons whom the corporation is believed to
represent.  An alternative justification that the U.S. Supreme Court
has sometimes relied on for granting expressive rights to corporations
is an instrumental rationale: protecting the rights of a corporation
serves some larger social purpose.  This rationale only works for free-
dom of speech and freedom of press by which it can be argued that
the speech or writings of a corporation enrich the pool of information
and perspectives available to citizens or other natural persons.  As the
Court has said, it is the speech that is protected not just the person
making the speech.158  The instrumental rationale does not work for
freedom of assembly or freedom to practice religion because those
rights only have value to the practitioners not to observers or listen-
ers.  This analysis suggests several lessons:
First, it would be a mistake for the Court to broadly regard all cor-
porations as having the full complement of First Amendment rights
regardless of their purposes and circumstances.  Recognizing this, the
Court attempted to narrow the implications of its decision in Hobby
Lobby by saying that the result only applies to “closely held corpora-
tions.”  The Court could have also limited its decision in Citizens
United to apply specifically to corporations that were formed and fi-
nanced by natural persons for the purpose of political advocacy, as
was the nonprofit corporation at issue.  Instead, it wrote the decision
broadly, seemingly applying the findings to all corporations all the
time.  The dissent in Citizens United expressed concern that the deci-
sion could have the effect of opening the door to the efforts of foreign
persons or organizations to influence election outcomes.159  Since Citi-
zens United, the Court has upheld prohibitions on campaign spending
by foreigners.160  But, because private for-profit corporations are not
required to reveal the sources of funds that they spend on indepen-
dent expenditures, it is not clear how this spending can be policed
without restricting which corporations can spend and what they can
158. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010).
159. Justice Stevens, in Citizens United, called attention to this problem.  558 U.S. at 424 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“If taken seriously, our colleagues’ assump-
tion that the identity of a speaker has no relevance to the Government’s ability to regulate
political speech would lead to some remarkable conclusions.  Such an assumption would . . .
appear to afford the same protection to multinational corporations controlled by foreigners as to
individual Americans . . . .”).
160. See, e.g., Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012) (mem.).
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spend it on.161  To clarify this point, the Court should consider adopt-
ing a more nuanced test in which it acknowledges that, at least with
respect to political speech, this expression only deserves to be pro-
tected if it comes, directly or indirectly (through a corporation that
truly represents them), from natural persons who are entitled to par-
ticipate in the democratic process in the United States.
Second, to restore some restraints, limit the potential for corrupting
influences in political campaigns in the United States, and protect
against other harms, the Court should carry out a three-part test in
future decisions regarding corporate constitutional rights:
1. The Court must determine if there is an identifiable and rela-
tively stable group of actual natural persons who are citizens or re-
sidents of the United States and who can credibly be said to be
represented by the corporation in question.
2. If the answer to the first question is yes, the Court should deter-
mine whether those natural persons intended to be acting together
through the corporation in question for the purpose of exercising the
expressive right in question.  If the answer is yes, the right should be
granted; however, if such an organization speaks out on political ques-
tions, the sources of the funding for the political speech must be made
public.
3. If the answer to either or both of the aforementioned questions
is no, then some rights—primarily freedom of speech or freedom of
press—might still be granted to the corporation on the basis of an
instrumental rationale if doing so serves to enrich the information and
points of view available to citizens or other natural persons who have
the right to have access to the information.162  If the instrumental ra-
tionale is the only basis for granting a challenged right, however, at
least two constraints on a corporation’s right to speak or publish
should be permitted: (1) the right of the corporation to speak or pub-
lish only applies to information and perspectives that come out of the
technology, special knowledge, or business experience of the corpora-
161. In Bluman, the Court did not explain why speech was not protected when it came from a
foreigner.  The entire decision was as follows: “Appeal from the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia.  Judgment affirmed.” Id.  This decision suggests that, despite its dis-
claimers, the Court does, in fact, consider from whom the speech comes.  In theory, one channel
of enforcement would be that the IRS could learn of foreign money flowing from a corporation
into political campaigns through information in tax filings of the corporation.  The IRS could
then report this activity to law enforcement authorities, which could pursue the offending corpo-
ration.  But, unless the IRS is given resources to support active screening of tax filings for im-
proper political spending by corporations, this is an extremely weak enforcement mechanism.
162. Insisting that the recipients of the information must have a right to receive the informa-
tion is necessary to ensure that corporations do not have the right to publish confidential infor-
mation (e.g., medical records or government classified information).
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tion;163 and (2) sources of the information being disseminated by the
corporation must be fully identified.  It would not contribute to full
discussion and debate of a policy question among the electorate for
voters to be barraged with anonymous claims and assertions.  The
public must be able to determine the source of information or per-
spectives on political matters for the information to be correctly un-
derstood, interpreted, and valued.
In Citizens United, the U.S. Supreme Court said that it did not want
to do “case-by-case determinations to verify whether political speech
is banned.”164  But, it also declined to draw a hard line that would be
easy to police by simply recognizing that corporate persons are not the
same as natural persons and allowing the government to restrain the
speech of corporate “persons.”  Going forward, the Court must under-
take a more difficult and nuanced analysis.
163. To continue to beat the ExxonMobil hypothetical, Barnett Gathering LLC, a wholly
owned pipeline subsidiary of ExxonMobil, likely has no special claim to expertise on vaccination
requirements for school children in the state of New Hampshire, so it should not have a constitu-
tional right to speak out on these issues.
164. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 329 (2010).
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